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I.

INTRODUCTION

"For almost three decades, 'American courts have struggled with
the question of whether to hold commercial sellers of used products to
the same legal standards of responsibility for defects as commercial
sellers of new products."" Despite the fact that a majority of jurisdictions now refuse to apply strict liability to commercial sellers of used
goods who did not create the alleged defect, and who sold the product
in the same condition as when the seller acquired it for resale,2 the
1. Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d 534, 535 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 cmt. a (1998)).

2. E.g., Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv. Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 231 (Okla.
2001). See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Products Liability: Application
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problem is no more resolved than when it began. The typical methods

used in the earlier decisions to resolve this issue were: (1) for each
jurisdiction to rely on its own perceptions of the policy considerations
justifying strict liability, and then apply those justifications to commercial sellers of used goods; 3 (2) to refuse to apply strict liability without

further explanation;4 or (3) to somewhat mechanically adhere to the
implications of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 Consequently,
much of the commentary on the subject falls within these categories
insofar as the authors analyze the debate in light of the various public
policy arguments the courts use when deciding whether to apply strict
liability to secondhand dealers.6

This apparent commitment to resolving the issue within the confines of tort law is unfortunate, because injustice will ensue, despite
the policy arguments a court uses to justify its position.7 To illustrate,
of Strict Liability Doctrine to Seller of Used Product, 9 A.L.R.5th 1, 1, 14-17, 24-28,
32-38, 43-51 (1993), 3 (Supp. 2002) (listing the various fact situations in which courts
refuse to apply strict liability to commercial sellers of used products).
3. See, e.g., Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 67-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975) (arguing in favor of the application of strict liability to commercial sellers
of used goods using various policy considerations and arguing to analyze those justifications (to extend or preclude the use of strict liability) to commercial sellers of used
goods); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1302-04 (Or. 1979) (refusing to
apply strict liability to commercial sellers of used goods based on state policy
considerations).
4. James S. Kats, Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability: Where Public
Safety and Caveat Emptor Intersect, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 330, 330 (1983) (citing Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 392 A.2d 130, 135 (N.H. 1978); Pridgett v. Jackson Iron
& Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 840, 844 (Miss. 1971)).
5. Id. at 330-31 (citing Sterner v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974); Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970); Rix v. Reeves, 532 P.2d 185
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill.
1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 305-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1975, no writ); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, 322 A.2d 440 (N.J. 1974)).
6. See, e.g., Steven J. Christiansen, Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability:
A PracticalApproach to a Complex Problem, 1981 BYU L. REV. 154, 157-59 (discussing policy considerations justifying strict liability); David B. Goodwin, Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?,
33 STAN. L. REV. 535, 537-48 (1981) (discussing policy considerations justifying strict
liability); Paul W. Hahn, Note, Consumer Protection: Should It Mandate Extension of
Section 402A to Used Products Dealers?, 50 Mo. L. REV. 186, 188-90 (1985) (discussing policy considerations justifying strict liability); Gary J. Highland, Note, Sales of
Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805,
811-19 (1979) (discussing policy considerations justifying strict liability); William L.
Humes, Note, The Application of Strict Liability in Tort to the Retailers of Used Products: A Proposal,16 OKLA. Ciry U. L. REv. 373, 384-96, 399-407 (1991) (discussing
policy considerations justifying strict liability); Kats, supra note 4, at 336-47 (discussing policy considerations justifying strict liability); Israel Ram6n, Jr., Note, TortsProducts Liability-Strict Liability Is Imposed on the Seller of a Defective Used Product, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 196 passim (1976) (examining various courts' decisions, which
fall into the three categories above).
7. Courts must continue answering the question of whether to burden the
seller because he may distribute the loss to buyers of other products or to
neglect the plaintiff and declare that he has no remedy since such decision
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applying strict liability to commercial sellers of used products, while
facilitating compensation to injured victims, poses substantial

problems for commercial sellers who are unable to pay large damage
awards and implement procedures to prevent product-related injuries

in the future.8 This result seems highly unfair to sellers of used products. Furthermore, the imposition of strict liability is counterproductive because it may "actually increase the total cost of accidents" 9-by
causing consumers to substitute noncommercial used goods, which

may be more dangerous, because noncommercial sellers of used goods
are not subject to strict liability and have no incentive to correct defects in the products they sell.1"
On the other hand, refusing to apply strict liability leaves consumers
at the mercy of the negligence doctrine and the warranty theory, both

of which are inherently inefficient in the area of products liability."
Subjecting injured consumers to the formidable task of proving negligence is unfair because, not only is negligence difficult and expensive
to prove, but also it often results in no compensation at all, given that

would be unfair to the seller of the used product. The recent cases indicate
that injustices may result regardless of whom the court holds liable.
Ram6n, supra note 6, at 202; see Goodwin, supra note 6, at 548 ("Taken together, the
four-part rationale for strict liability [enterprise liability, market deterrence, compensation, and implied representation], does not unambiguously resolve the question of
strict liability for commercial sellers of used products.").
8. See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 527 (Wis. 1991) (Steinmetz, J., concurring) (quoting Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990));
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 548; see also Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304 ("The dealer in used
goods generally has no direct relationship with either manufacturers or distributors.
Thus, there is no ready channel of communication by which the dealer and the manufacturer can exchange information about possible dangerous defects in particular
product lines or about actual and potential liability claims."); Frey v. Harley Davidson
Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
Most dealers in used products cannot and/or do not influence the safety related decisions of the original manufacturers and distributors of those products when new because there is no relationship between those sellers who
initially put the product into the stream of commerce and those who redistribute it much farther downstream. Thus, to impose strict product liability
would merely impose a burden on used product dealers that many could not
bear ....
Id.
9. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 548; Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 529-30 (Steinmetz,
J., concurring).
10. See Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 529-30 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
11. See generally LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 235 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981); FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICr LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 20
(1989) ("[W]ith strict liability the courts are trying to distance themselves from negligence and to favor the consumer while at the same time reducing his burden of
proof."); Highland, supra note 6, at 817-18 ("One of the reasons for establishing strict
liability 'was to relieve [the] plaintiff from the problems of proof inherent in pursuing
negligence .... ') (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal.
1972)) (alteration in original).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

TexasTEXAS
Wesleyan WESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
9 [2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 5
REVIEW

[Vol. 9

"defects frequently occur[ ] even in the absence of negligence."' 2 Furthermore, the warranty theory contains a number of stringent require13
ments that often lead to no compensation for injured consumers.
In this light, a well-reasoned decision to apply, or to refuse to apply,
strict liability to commercial sellers of used goods essentially becomes
a choice between the lesser of two evils. As evidenced by a recent
Oklahoma decision on the subject, this method of determining
whether to apply strict liability to secondhand dealers will continue. 4
Thus, unfair, inefficient, and unjust resolutions of situations in which
an unlucky consumer is seriously injured or killed because of a defect
in a used product will endure.
This Comment will discuss the inability of tort law to provide an
adequate solution to this issue, and why this issue should be taken out
of the hands of the courts altogether and regulated by state legislatures. State legislatures have the capability to fashion a solution to
this problem that would provide adequate compensation to injured
consumers without: (1) adversely affecting the used goods market; (2)
forcing injured consumers to deal with the expenses and difficulties of
litigation using the negligence doctrine or warranty theory; or (3) unfairly holding secondhand dealers liable for defects they did not cause
that may put them out of business. In Part II, this Comment will give
a brief overview of the history of strict liability for products. Part III
will canvass the various policy considerations of strict liability on
which courts rely when faced with this issue. Part IV will explain why
any solution based on the policy considerations of strict liability is inadequate. Finally, Part V will propose that a no-fault compensation
plan fashioned by a state legislature could offer an effective remedy to
the problem. Part VI will conclude with some final remarks on the
future of products liability law.
II.

ORIGIN OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS

The evolution of products liability in tort involved concepts from
traditional tort law, as well as concepts from contract law. 1 5 Expanded negligence principles were combined with the notion of
"strict" liability from contract law to form an entirely new theory of
liability that would govern product-related injuries. a6
12. See Kats, supra note 4, at 332 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150

P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
13. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 690-92 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Allenburg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv. Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 231 (Okla. 2001)
(refusing to apply strict liability to commercial sellers of used products based on an
evaluation of the relevant policy considerations of past decisions).
15. 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 5:2,
at 253 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MADDEN & OWEN].
16. See id.
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A.

Tort Law: Expansion of the Negligence Theory

The earliest tort law cases involving product-related injuries were
confined to the traditional principles of negligence.17 From the decisions rendered in these earlier cases, it was apparent that the duty of
reasonable care and the concept of foreseeability of harm were to be
limited to encompass only those parties who had a contractual relationship with each other.18 Thus, where a consumer was injured by a
manufacturer's product, but did not purchase the product directly
from the manufacturer, the consumer could not bring a negligence
cause of action against the manufacturer because it was not foreseeable that the consumer would be harmed by the product, absent a
contractual relationship.1 9 The privity requirement effectively protected manufacturers from liability if a retailer sold the manufacturer's product to a consumer, no matter how negligent a
manufacturer may have been in designing or producing a defective
product.2 °
The limitations on the concept of foreseeability in light of the privity requirement can be seen in the nineteenth-century English case
Winterbottom v. Wright.2 1 Winterbottom was injured when a coach he
was driving collapsed.22 He sued Wright, the serviceman of the coach,
in negligence for his injuries, but was denied recovery because Wright
had a contractual relationship with Winterbottom's employer, and not
with Winterbottom directly.23 Lord Abinger reasoned:
There is no privity of contract between [the plaintiff and the defendant]; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them,
the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see
no limit, would ensue.24
Thus, the privity requirement prevented many injured consumers
from maintaining a negligence cause of action, notwithstanding the
17. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 612-15 (4th ed.
2001) (giving a brief history of the development of strict liability for products).
18. See, e.g., Humes, supra note 6, at 377-78 ("The concept of duty is often defined and limited by the nature of the relationship between the parties.") (citing EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL § 4-5, at 102-12 (3d. ed. 1999)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 377-78.
21. See 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842), microformed on The English ReportsVolumes 91 to 176 CD-ROM (Jutastat Ltd.), discussed in PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 13, § 96, at 681, and Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution:
The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 695-97 (1993).
22. See id. at 403.
23. See id. at 402-03, 405.
24. Id. at 405.
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fact that a manufacturer's or service provider's negligence was the
cause of injury."
However, courts have acknowledged some exceptions to the privity
requirement in situations involving inherently or imminently dangerous products.26 This exception applies to the negligent manufacture
of products such as food, drugs, firearms, and explosives.27 For instance, in the influential New York case Thomas v. Winchester,2 8 a
drug manufacturer mislabeled a bottle of belladonna, a deadly poison,
as a harmless bottle of dandelion extract. 29 The manufacturer sold the
bottle to a druggist, who in turn sold the bottle to a second druggist,
who then sold the bottle to the plaintiff.3" Despite there being no
privity between the manufacturer and the plaintiff, the court held the
manufacturer liable under the negligence doctrine.31 In extinguishing
the privity requirement in this instance, the court explained:
[There is a] distinction.., between an act of negligence imminently
dangerous to the lives of others, and one that is not so. In the former case, the party guilty of the negligence is liable to the party
injured, whether there be a contract between them or not; in the
latter, the negligent party is liable only to the party with whom he
contracted,
and on the ground that negligence is a breach of the
32
contract.

Although this case destroyed the privity rule for inherently or imminently dangerous products,33 the privity requirement remained in
place for other products. 34 This served to insulate manufacturers from
injured consumers where there was no privity. 35 This obstacle to manufacturer liability would last until the beginning of the twentieth
century.3 6
Finally, in 1916, the New York Court of Appeals bridged the gap
between negligently made inherently dangerous products and negligently made inherently non-dangerous products in the landmark case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 37 In this case, MacPherson successfully sued Buick for negligence when a car that MacPherson purchased from a dealer, not directly from Buick, proved to be
25. Croley & Hanson, supra note 21, at 696.
26. See, e.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); see also PROSSER &
TON, supra note 13, § 96, at 682.
27. Kats, supra note 4, at 331.
28. See 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
29. Id. at 405.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 409-11.
32. Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 256.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-55 (N.Y. 1916).
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol9/iss2/5
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defective. 38 MacPhersonhad two extremely influential effects on the
negligence doctrine with regard to product-related injuries. 39 Apart
from removing the privity requirement from negligence actions, MacPherson allowed consumers to sue manufacturers for injuries caused
by any product-not simply those products that were inherently or
imminently dangerous.40 The court held:
[T]he principle [that manufacturers owe a duty of care beyond the
immediate purchaser] is not limited to poisons, explosives, and
things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are
implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it then is a thing of danger.
Although the MacPhersondecision signaled the end of the privity requirement and broadened the category of manufacturers against
whom the negligence doctrine could successfully be used, the burden
of proving42 the defendant's fault still loomed large for injured
consumers.
B.

Law of Contracts: Warranty Theory
Because of the problems and expense of proving negligence against
manufacturers, 3 many consumers injured by defective products opted
to sue under the warranty theory. 44 The warranty theory was preferred because the manufacturers' liability was "strict," in that it did
not depend upon proof of the manufacturers' negligence or fault. 5
Initially, breach of warranty was a tort action 4 6 that preceded any
notions of contract law or the law of assumpsit. 47 Being grounded in
38. See id. at 1051.
39. Croley & Hanson, supra note 21, at 697 (stating that MacPherson "was important in two respects": "it dealt a serious blow to the privity rule by allowing a person
other than the immediate purchaser to recover from a manufacturer," and "it moved
the liability standard away from absolute consumer liability toward negligence by significantly expanding the application of the negligence standard beyond those cases
that involved 'imminently dangerous' products").
40. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
41. Id.
42. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 256.
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. Humes, supra note 6, at 379.
45. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 253; Humes, supra note 6, at
379.
46. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN.
L. REV. 117, 118 (1943) [hereinafter Prosser, Implied Warranty].
47. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 254; LAW DICrIONARY 35 (Barron's 4th ed. 1996).
Under mature English law, actions in assumpsit for expectation damages,
based on defendant's breach of an express contract whose details were al-

leged in the complaint, came to be known as SPECIAL ASSUMPSIT. Actions in
assumpsit to recover a debt came to be known as GENERAL ASSUMPSIT. In
certain cases, general assumpsit was proper even though the contract was
express-for example, where the plaintiff had not fully performed but the
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tort, a cause of action for breach of warranty was usually justified by
reference to some form of misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, or express
warranty. 4 8 However, shortly following 1750, attorneys viewed an express warranty claim as a contract provision and began grounding
these claims as a form of breach of contract. 49 Furthermore, by the
beginning of the nineteenth century, near the emergence of the implied warranty theory, attorneys were taught that a warranty claim
was a part of contract law.5° Thus, breach of warranty became equated
to the notion of breach of contract. 51 A number of limitations to recovery under a warranty theory resulted from its association with
traditional contract law.52 For instance, in order to bring a successful
warranty claim, the consumer had to: (1) rely on an express or implied
assertion; 53 (2) provide notice of the breach shortly after the consumer
knew or should have known of the breach; 54 (3) be in privity with the
seller of the product; 55 and (4) overcome any disclaimers by the
seller.56
Warranty law continued to be grounded in tort in food cases, despite modern conceptions of a warranty claim as being a part of the
law of contracts.5 7 For example, when a consumer was injured by
tainted food, the consumer of that food could sue the manufacturer,
nonperformance was excusable, or where the plaintiff had fully performed
and nothing remained but the payment of the price in money by the defendant. General assumpsit was also the appropriate action for a promise implied in either fact or in law, and was accordingly the action of choice where
plaintiff was suing for restitution-even restitution for benefits conferred
under an express contract.
Id.
See Prosser, Implied Warranty, supra note 46, at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120.
See id. at 120-21.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965); see 1 MADDEN &
OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 256 ("[A]lthough the courts were divided, many jurisdictions enforced a special food warranty running to remote consumers that lay
outside of contract law and hence was one of tort."); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
This court and many others have extended protection according to such a
[warranty] standard to consumers of food products, taking the view that the
right of a consumer injured by unwholesome food does not depend "upon
the intricacies of the law of sales" and that the warranty of the manufacturer
to the consumer in absence of privity of contract rests on public policy.
Id. at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring) (quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. Supp.
322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
53. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
54. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 801 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Fall of the Citadel].
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 800-01.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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even in the absence of privity.5 8 Nevertheless, the courts refused to
expressly abolish the privity requirement5 9 and devised "various fictions to rationalize the extension of the manufacturer's [implied] warranty to the consumer."6
For instance, the courts reasoned:
that a warranty runs with the chattel; that the cause of action of the
dealer is assigned to the consumer; that the consumer is a third
party beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer.
They... also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fiction of negligence: "Practically he must know it [the
' 6 1 product] is fit, or take the
consequences, if it proves destructive."
The implied warranty theory spread beyond the food cases to cover
products other than food for human consumption, such as animal food
and "products for intimate bodily use, such as cosmetics., 62 But as
one commentator explains, "[a] partial extention to other products
came in 1958, with Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc.," 6 3 which involved an implied warranty for cinder blocks.6 4 Then
in 1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued a landmark decision
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 65 In this case, Clause Henningsen purchased a car from Bloomfield Motors, and was manufactured by Chrysler Corporation.6 6 Henningsen's wife was injured when
a defect in the car caused it to hit a brick wall.67 Mrs. Henningsen
sued both Bloomfield Motors and Chrysler for "breach of express and
implied warranties and for negligence." 6 8 However, at trial, the negligence claims were dismissed, leaving only the implied warranty issue,
upon which both defendants were held liable.6 9 On appeal, the court
held that neither the privity requirement 70 nor Chrysler's disclaimer
would bar Mrs. Henningsen's recovery.7 1 Thus, it was settled that an
implied warranty of safety attached to a product, even in the absence
58. See id. at 800-01 (implying that the warranty would attach to the food product
and remain with it no matter through whose hands it passed).
59. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (citing Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. Supp. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1912); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1939); Decker & Sons,
Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942); Rollin M. Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a
Source of Liability, 5 IOWA L. BULL. 6, 86 (1919)).
60. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring) (quoting Parks v. G.C. Yost Pie Co., 144 P. 202
(Kan. 1914)) (alteration in original).

62.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. b (1965);

PROSSER

&

KEE-

supra note 13, § 97, at 690.
63. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 97, at 690 (citing Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Mich. 1958)).
64. Spence, 90 N.W.2d at 874-85.
65. See 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
66. Id. at 73.
67. See id. at 75.
68. Id. at 73.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 83.
71. See id. at 95.

TON,

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

9

Texas
Wesleyan
Law Review, Vol.
9 [2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 5
WESLEYAN
LAW
REVIEW
TEXAS

[Vol. 9

of privity or proof of negligence, and despite a manufacturer's attempt
to limit liability through disclaimers. Many jurisdictions followed the
lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court.7 2
Acceptance of this new form of implied warranty was further supported by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).7 3 In solidifying
the existence of an implied warranty, section 2-314 provides that "a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale,"7 4 and those goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."7 5 Furthermore, the U.C.C. recognizes the trend to hold manufacturers liable under a warranty
theory in absence of privity in that "[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be76affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty.

Despite the increased applicability of warranty theory to productrelated injuries, the doctrine continues to pose significant problems
for injured consumers because of its foundation in contract law.77 For
example, the requirement that the consumer must rely on a manufacturer's assertion creates difficulties when the consumer does not know
who manufactured the product.78 The "notice" requirement also
serves as an obstacle to recovery because "[t]he injured consumer is
seldom 'steeped in the "business practice" which justifies the rule,'
and at least until he has legal advice, it will not occur to him to give
notice to one with whom he has had no dealings."' 79 Finally, the
U.C.C. recognizes a manufacturer's ability to avoid liability with a
disclaimer.8"
C.

Strict Liability for Products in Tort Law

As early as the 1930s, commentators recognized the problems with
warranty theory and the negligence doctrine in the area of productrelated injuries and suggested a new form of strict liability for defective products that would lie in tort.8 1 As Dean William Prosser
explains:
72. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 97, at 690 ("There was a deluge
of cases in other jurisdictions following the lead of New Jersey, and finding an implied
warranty of safety as to a wide assortment of products. It is quite clear that the 'citadel of privity' has fallen.").
73. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).
74. See id. § 2-314(1).
75. See id. § 2-314(2)(c).
76. See id. § 2-318 (Alternative C).
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 97, at 691.
78. See id.
79. Id. (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (Pt. II: Manufacturers), 34
TEX. L. REV. 192, 192, 197 (1955)) (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 656 (citing U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977)).
81. See, e.g., Robert C. Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food
Products,23 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1939); L.W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor
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[T]he suggestion was sufficiently obvious that all of the trouble lay
with the one word "warranty," which had been from the outset only
a rather transparent device to accomplish the desired result of strict
liability. No one disputed that the "warranty" was a matter of strict
liability. No one denied that where there was no privity, liability to
the consumer could not sound in contract and must be a matter of
tort. Why not, then, talk of the strict liability in tort, a thing familiar
enough in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, libel, misrepresentation, and respondeat superior, and
82 discard the word "warranty" with all its
contract implications?
Heeding the arguments for strict liability in tort, Justice Traynor initiated its development in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co.,83 dubbed by one scholar as "the most renowned
concurring opinion in all of American tort law." 84 The case involved a
waitress who was injured when a Coca Cola bottle exploded in her
hand. Notwithstanding that the exact cause of the explosion was unknown, the Supreme Court of California reasoned that the waitress
could use the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to supply an inference of negligence.86 In his concurrence, Justice Traynor addressed both the negligence doctrine and warranty theory, and explained that strict liability
in tort was the next logical step for cases involving product-related
injuries.8 7 In analyzing the negligence doctrine, Justice Traynor
explained:
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled
out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover ....[I]t should now

be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when
an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to human beings .... In these cases the source of the manufac-

turer's liability was his negligence [but e]ven if there is no negligence, .

.

. public policy demands that responsibility be fixed

wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life
and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market. 88
Justice Traynor also noted that the negligence doctrine, as it currently
applies to product-related injuries, approaches strict liability and
should be replaced by the strict liability doctrine if courts wish to hold
in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930); John
Barker Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. REV. 494
(1936).
82. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 54, at 802.
83. See 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
84. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 257.
85. Escola, 150 P.2d at 437.
86. Id. at 440.
87. See id. at 440-44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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manufacturers responsible, regardless of negligence or fault, for the
products they place on the market.8 9 He argued:
The injury from a defective product does not become a matter of
indifference because the defect arises from causes other than the
negligence of the manufacturer, such as negligence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects could not be revealed by inspection or unknown causes that even by the device of
res ipsa loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer. The inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper care. If the evidence against the fact inferred
is "clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it can
not rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the jury that
the nonexistence of the fact has been established as a matter of
law." An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to
refute such evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can
hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the
negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly
circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose
what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality
regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly.9 °
Next, Justice Traynor explained why strict liability should be preferred over warranty theory.9 1 "Observing the analogy to the food
warranty cases, Justice Traynor asserted that the same doctrine should
be extended to products in general."9 2 Rather than relying on fictitious rationalizations to extend the manufacturer's warranty to consumers, Justice Traynor felt that "[s]uch fictions [were] not necessary
to fix the manufacturer's liability under a warranty if the warranty is
severed from the contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer and based on the law of torts as a strict liability."9 3
Finally, Justice Traynor maintained that strict liability was necessary
because "the close relationship between ...producer and consumer
has been altered."9 4 He reasoned that:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its
[m]anufacturing
great markets and transportation facilities, ...
89. See id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring) (quoting Blank v. Coffin, 126 P.2d 868, 870 (Cal.
1942)).
91. See id. at 441-44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
92. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 258; Escola, 150 P.2d at 442

(Traynor, J., concurring) ("Dangers to life and health inhere in other consumers'
goods that are defective and there is no reason to differentiate them from the dangers
of defective food products.").
93. Escola, 150 P.2d at 442-43 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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processes ... are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken

of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill
enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, ...
and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing
devises such as trade-marks .... The manufacturer's obligation to

the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has become
so complicated as to require one or more
95
intermediaries.
Thus, Justice Traynor's concurrence was the first real instance when
the theory of strict liability in tort was not only articulated in a judicial
opinion, but suggested as a more adequate remedy for consumers injured by defective products. Despite the soundness of Justice Traynor's concurrence, "it received little more than passing notice for
96
many years."

Not until almost twenty years later would strict liability in tort be
established as the leading doctrine in defective products cases. This
took place in 1963, when the Supreme Court of California issued the
decision in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.97 In Greenman, the plaintiff was seriously injured when a defect

in a combination power tool he received as a Christmas gift caused a
piece of wood to fly out of the machine and hit him in the head. 98 He
sued both the retailer and the manufacturer for negligence and breach
of warranty, and the manufacturer of the product was held liable for
negligence and breach of express warranty. 99 The manufacturer appealed, claiming that the plaintiff did not give notice of the breach
within a reasonable time. 100 Justice Traynor, this time speaking for a
unanimous court, authored the opinion.101 Dispensing with the notice
requirement for express and implied warranties, Justice Traynor explained that not only was it inappropriate "for the court to adopt [the
notice requirement] in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers,"1'0 2 but "to impose strict liability on the manufacturer under
the circumstances of this case, it was not [even] necessary for [the]
plaintiff to establish an express warranty.""1 3 Relying on case law
from various jurisdictions, Justice Traynor argued that:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on
the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the man95. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
96. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:2, at 259.
97. See 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
98. See id. at 898.
99. Id. at 898, 899.
100. Id. at 899.
101. See id. at 898, 902.
102. See id. at 899-900.
103. Id. at 900.
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ufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a
contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for
defective products make clear that the liability is not one governed
by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in
tort. Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that
were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to
those injured by their defective products unless those rules also
serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed ....
The purpose .. .is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect
themselves. Sales warranties serve this
10 4
purpose fitfully at best.
Thus, when a manufacturer places a product on the market, knowing
that it will not be inspected for defects, that manufacturer is strictly
10 5
liable in tort if that product's defects cause injury to human beings.
Finally, strict liability in tort emerged to govern cases involving product-related injuries.
Two years later, the American Law Institute published section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"°6 which solidified the doctrine's
dominance in the area of products liability. Section 402A provides
that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused."' 0 7 The Restatement makes
clear that liability under section 402A "does not rest upon negligence" 10 8 and "is a very different kind of warranty from those usually
found in the sale of goods ... [in that] it is not subject to the various
contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales." 1 9 Thus,
from the amalgamation of traditional negligence and contract law
principles came the doctrine of strict liability in tort.

104. Id. at 901 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110
N.W.2d 449, 455-56 (Iowa 1961); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 418
(Kan. 1954); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio 1958);
Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 164 A.2d 773, 778 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1960); Linn v. Radio Ctr. Delicatessen, Inc., 9 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655, 658-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); Decker
& Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831-32 (Tex. 1942); William L. Prosser, The
Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1124-34 (1960)).

105. Id. at 900.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
107. Id.
108. See id. at cmt. m.
109. Id.
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III.

POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STRICT LIABILITY"

°

As the strict liability doctrine began to gain popularity in the 1960s,
courts and commentators offered a number of different public policy
arguments to justify its role in the area of products liability."1 Although many justifications "generally predicat[ed] such liability on the
increasing intricacy and danger of modern products comprised of
complex mechanical and chemical substances, the safety of which...
modern consumers had no practical way to detect, 11 2 a need to promote two very important goals of social policy became discernible." 3
One was "the need to provide compensation to injured consumers,
through the mechanism of risk-spreading, by means of a third-party
accident insurance system imposed on manufacturers by the
courts.' 1 14 The other was "the need to improve product safety and
restrain the power of manufacturers through rules designed to deter
the production of dangerous products.""' 5 The modern equivalent of
these two functions is what one commentator labels, the "traditional
four-fold rationale for strict liability" that encompasses "enterprise liability, market deterrence, compensation, and implied representation."" 6 The first goal is promoted through the compensation and
implied representation justifications because they "address the need
to repay accident victims for any injury or disappointment caused by a
defective product.""' 7 The second goal is promoted through enterprise liability and market deterrence arguments that "focus on reducing the number of accidents caused by defective products.""' 8 A brief
overview of each policy justification will be represented in the following subparts to provide a better understanding of the justifications as
they apply to commercial sellers of used goods.

110. For a more comprehensive discussion of the policy justifications for the strict
liability doctrine, see Humes, supra note 6, at 384-96, 399-407.
111. See, e.g., 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:4, at 282-83; see also David
G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 430-31 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations].
112. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:4, at 283.
113. See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 111, at 430-31.
114. Id. at 430.
115. Id. at 430-31.
116. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 536.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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Enterprise Liability" 9

Enterprise liability is generally considered the predominant policy
justification for strict products liability."' 0 Support for this theory has
the rubric of either fairness considerations or economic
come under
121
utility.
The argument underlying the fairness prong of enterprise liability
theory is that product manufacturers will inevitably place some defective products into the stream of commerce.122 Because the manufacturer or that "enterprise" benefits from the activity in the form of
profits, it is the enterprise, and not the injured consumer, who should
bear the costs associated with the products.12 3 Enterprise liability
forces manufacturers to internalize the accident costs related to their
defective products as a cost of doing business, similar to the manner in
which manufacturers must absorb other production costs, including
materials, labor, and capital. 124 This result is perceived as fair because
of the presumption that the "doer" should bear the burden of
losses,12 5 which is the enterprise in this case.
"The economic utility of enterprise liability is that, theoretically, it
tends to promote optimal allocation of society's resources through
market processes." 126 The basic assumption of this proposition is that
consumers should be able to judge the safety of a product through its
price as compared to other competing products.1 2 7 However, for this
to occur, the enterprise responsible for placing defective products into
the market must internalize the injury-related costs of its products and
accurately reflect that cost in the product's price. 2 8 As enterprises
are held strictly liable for the injuries their products cause, those enterprises will have to pay compensation to victims or higher insurance
premiums, which they will then pass on to consumers in the form of
119. For a more comprehensive discussion of the theory of Enterprise Liability, see
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500-07, 514-15 (1961), and Humes, supra note 6, at 387-91. A broad
discussion of the Enterprise Liability theory is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Accordingly, this Comment generally touches on a few aspects of the Allocation of
Resources Justification for strict liability as articulated in the Calabresi and Humes
articles. Therefore, use of similar language, concepts, and ideas is only meant to
adequately convey the gist of the Allocation of Resources Justification for strict
liability and is in no way meant to assume responsibility for the manner in which the
theory is presented.
120. See, e.g., Highland, supra note 6, at 811; Humes, supra note 6, at 387.
121. See Highland, supra note 6, at 811-12.
122. See Christiansen, supra note 6, at 157-58.
123. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law
Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2001).
124. 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:4, at 283.
125. Humes, supra note 6, at 387.
126. Highland, supra note 6, at 812.
127. See Humes, supra note 6, at 388-90.
128. See id. at 388-89.
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increased prices for their products.129 If the increased price of the
product reflects the costs associated with the activity, then the natural
tendency of consumers to substitute lower-priced products will also
result in greater consumption of safer products, thus, a decrease in
total accident costs to society.130 "The 'hidden' value of these products becomes apparent when compared to more dangerous products,
which are priced relatively higher under a strict liability system than
under a non-strict liability system."'' Optimal allocation of resources
is realized because the consumer is able to make an informed decision
about which product to purchase and thus, purchases only the products that he or she truly desires.1 32
However, in order to prevent a misallocation of resources and a
possible increase in total accident costs to society, strict liability must
be applied across the board to all similar products. 1 33 If a manufacturer produces a more dangerous product but is not subject to strict
liability, then that manufacturer will not be forced to internalize the
accident costs associated with its products, and the price of those
products will not increase. 1 34 As compared to the other, more expensive products that are subject to strict liability, it will be those cheaper,
more risky products that will attract consumers, and the result will be
1 35
a misallocation of resources and an increase in accident costs.
B.

Market Deterrence

"While enterprise liability functions to reduce consumption of a
product whose price increases after strict liability is imposed, market
deterrence depends on the impact of increased liability costs on producers and sellers.1' 1 36 Strict liability provides an economic incentive
for companies to produce safer products. 1 37 The resultant decrease in
injury costs may take place in two instances.13 8 The first occurs when
a company is faced with injury costs that are greater than the costs of
implementing procedures to produce safer products. 39 In this instance, it would be more cost-efficient for the company to eliminate
the defects in its products that cause injury to consumers than continue to compensate those injured consumers through the strict liability system. 4 ° The second manner in which strict liability may lead to
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 388-89.
See id. at 389; Highland, supra note 6, at 813-14 & n.67.
Highland, supra note 6, at 813-14.
See Humes, supra note 6, at 388.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 389.
See id. at 389-90.
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 539.
Highland, supra note 6, at 815.
Id.
See id.
See id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

17

REVIEW
TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
9 [2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 5

[Vol. 9

the production of safer products is through the allocation-of-resources
argument mentioned in the previous subpart.' 4 ' When strict liability
is applied to a manufacturer whose products are less expensive,
though more dangerous than those of competitors, because of a refusal to improve its production process, that manufacturer is forced to
internalize the accident costs of those products, thereby increasing
their price to consumers.1 42 Because the products are more dangerous
than available substitutes, the price increase caused by the internalization of accident costs will reveal the actual cost of those products to
society, 143 which will be higher than that
of products already made
144
safer through the strict liability system.
C.

Compensation

Although compensation alone should not be the primary consideration in applying strict liability, 4 5 it is important to note the manner in
which strict liability facilitates compensation to injured consumers.
Strict liability removes the need to prove the manufacturer's fault in
order to receive compensation from that manufacturer."' 6 This aids
the injured consumer because proving negligence against the manufacturer is expensive and, at times, impossible. 14'7 Furthermore, strict
liability dispenses with the traditional contract limitations that continue to plague the warranty theory."18 Despite the inadequacy of
compensation to stand alone as a justification for strict liability, the
importance of it cannot be overlooked. If strict liability did not make
it substantially easier for injured consumers to obtain compensation
from manufacturers of defective products, then the overwhelming
costs of lost time and health care that results from injury would fall
upon the injured
consumers who are unprepared to remedy its
49
consequences.'
D.

Implied Representation

The implied representation justification for strict liability is a holdover from warranty theory. 50 The purpose of this justification is both
"to protect the consumer's fair expectations of safety in goods mass
141. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 126-35.
142. See Highland, supra note 6, at 815-16.
143. See id. at 815.
144. See id. at 815-16.
145. Humes, supra note 6, at 396.
146. See id.
147. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 104.
149. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
150. See 1 MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 15, § 5:4, at 284.
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merchandized by reputable manufacturers" 151 and to force1 manufac52
turers to stand behind the implicit safety of their products.
With regard to consumer expectations, Justice Traynor articulated
an implied representation justification in his opinion in Greenman. 5 3
He argued that "[i]mplicit in the machine's presence on the market ...
was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was
built."' 5 4 Justice Traynor went on to base the manufacturer's liability
on this implied representation, stating:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the [product] in a way it
was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
55 not aware that made the [product]
unsafe for its intended use.'
Despite criticism from some commentators that an implied representation theory, standing alone, is not a sufficient justification for strict
liability,' 5 6 a number of jurisdictions continue to include it as one of
the major policy justifications supporting strict liability.' 5 7
IV.

INADEQUACY OF TORT LAW TO DEAL WITH COMMERCIAL
SELLERS OF USED GOODS

Because of certain unique features of the used goods market, the
conventional methods used to reach a decision whether to apply strict
liability to commercial sellers of used goods are obsolete. Additionally, substantial hardships to both secondhand dealers and injured
consumers are likely to result, whether a court chooses to apply strict
liability in this situation or not.
A.

Harm Caused by Applying Strict Liability to Commercial Sellers
of Used Goods

Many of the public policy justifications supporting the application
of strict liability to some entities do not support the application of
strict liability to secondhand dealers.' 58 Because of the popularity of
noncommercial used goods,' 5 9 the marginal profitability of used goods
151. Id.
152. See Humes, supra note 6, at 395.
153. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Highland, supra note 6, at 818; Roscoe Steffen, Enterprise Liability:
Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 167 (1965).
157. See Highland, supra note 6, at 818.
158. See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979) ("[Tlhe relevant policy considerations do not justify imposing strict liability for defective products
on dealers in used goods, at least in the absence of some representation of quality
beyond the sale itself or of a special position vis-A-vis the original manufacturer or
others in the chain of original distribution.").
159. See Humes, supra note 6, at 401.
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dealers, 16 0 and the economic status of many of the consumers of used
goods, 6 the application of strict liability in this situation would have
a substantial adverse effect on the used goods market and those
involved.
1.

Possible Increase in the Total Cost of Product-Related Injuries

Many courts argue that "if a jurisdiction has adopted the principle
of strict liability on the basis of enterprise liability, the liability of the
seller of either a new or used product would logically follow.' 62 This
is because the policy of enterprise liability is to force those responsible
for placing the defective product into the stream of commerce to internalize the consequent accident costs as a cost of doing business.1 63
Like sellers of new products, commercial sellers of used products are
equally capable, then, of distributing accident costs to consumers in
the form of higher prices. 1641hiWhile this argument may seem attractive
theoretically, its application in the used goods
market may actually
165
serve to increase the total costs of accidents.
The adverse effect of applying strict liability to commercial sellers
of used goods is a result of one of the limitations expressly stated in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 6 6 Comment (f) to
section 402A provides that "[t]he rule stated ... applies to any person
engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption, 16 7
but does not apply to "the occasional seller of food or other such
products who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his business."' 168 The comment continues:
Thus it does not apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells
to her neighbor a jar of jam or a pound of sugar. Nor does it apply
to the owner of an automobile who, on one occasion, sells it to his
neighbor, or even sells it to a dealer in used cars, and 1this
even
69
though he is fully aware that the dealer plans to resell it.
Because of the failure to apply strict liability across the board to all
sellers in the used goods enterprise, the result may be a misallocation
of resources and an increase in total product-related accidents. To illustrate, if strict liability is applied to commercial sellers of used
goods, then those sellers will internalize the accident costs associated
with their products, which will, in turn, cause an increase in the price
160. See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 529 (Wis. 1991) (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
161. See id.
162. E.g., Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1302.
163. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
164. Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
165. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

166.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

167. Id. at cmt. f.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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of those products. 7 ° On the other hand, as the price of commercial
used goods rises, noncommercial used goods or used goods sold by
occasional sellers will become more attractive because those prices
will remain the same.1 7 1 However, noncommercial used goods may be
more risky than commercial used goods. 17 2 If this is true, then applying strict liability to commercial sellers of used goods and not to noncommercial sellers of used goods will cause consumers to substitute
cheaper, more risky noncommercial goods, thereby increasing the total number of accidents and injury-related costs. 17 3 Unfortunately,
consumers injured by noncommercial used goods will generally bear
the majority of the accident costs because of the difficulties in proving
negligence and of the fact that noncommercial sellers of used goods
are not subject to strict liability.1 74 Furthermore, resources will be
misallocated because consumers will purchase more risky, noncommercial used goods that they would not have purchased had they
known the true cost of such products. 175 Based on the reasoning outlined above, strict liability will generally increase the total cost of accidents to society caused by defects in used goods, and will cause
resource misallocation unless it is applied to noncommercial sellers of
176
used products.
2.

Substantial Burden Placed on Used Goods Dealers

In order for the application of strict liability to the used goods market to effectively reduce the total cost of product-related accidents, it
is crucial that the enterprise have the ability to internalize and pass on
the increased costs of doing business. 177 The ability to absorb this increased cost is, in turn, directly related to the profitability of the used
goods dealer. This is because the dealer must have assets available to
cover unfavorable strict liability judgments either personally or in the
form of increased insurance premiums, and the dealer must be able to
increase inspection and repair of its used goods in order to avoid such
judgments in the future. 1 78 Because many used goods dealers are
small businesses, it is unlikely that they would have the financial
power to bear the increased costs associated with the imposition of
strict liability and may be forced to go out of business. 79
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
1999);
179.

See Humes, supra note 6, at 400-02.
See id. at 401-02.
Id. at 402.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 400-01.
See id. at 400-02.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 18-19 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 543-44.
Frey, 734 A.2d at 18-19.
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When faced with an adverse strict liability judgment, dealers in used
goods must first determine how they will pay damages. Theoretically,
a used goods dealer should be properly insured against such judgments; however, the cost and availability of insurance poses significant
problems for used goods dealers.1 8 For example, a great number of
businesses involved in selling used products are only marginally profitable and simply do not have the finances to purchase sufficient insurance. 18 1 In these situations, an unfavorable strict liability judgment is
likely to force the used goods dealer out of business, because an unin182
sured dealer generally has no other means to cover damage awards.
Furthermore, even if a used goods dealer could afford proper insurance, he or she would still have to contend with the decreasing or
nonexistent availability of such insurance. 8 3 Finally, if a dealer in
used goods is even able to locate and afford adequate insurance, the
application of strict liability to sellers of used goods is certain to cause
an increase in the price of insurance premiums for that dealer because
the strict liability doctrine makes it easier for the dealer to be held
liable. "84
' Accordingly, this will result in an increase in the cost of doing business, which marginally profitable used goods dealers are unable to absorb.' 8 5
Similarly, it is important to note that the mechanisms that usually
allow a manufacturer or supplier of products to spread the risk of loss
associated with adverse judgments, particularly indemnification and
contribution, are not as effective for dealers of used goods. 1 86 Generally, after paying damages in a product liability suit, a manufacturer,
retailer, or supplier may seek indemnification or contribution for part
or all of those losses if it can prove that another party was completely
or partially responsible for the injury-causing defect.' 8 7 "Indemnity
enables a tortfeasor to shift the entire liability to another party, while
contribution allows him to shift a portion of the liability."'1 8 8 However, in the used goods market, the efficacy of indemnification and
contribution is greatly reduced because used goods dealers typically
do not maintain a working relationship with the manufacturers, designers, or suppliers of the secondhand goods. 189 Because of the time
lapse between the manufacture or design of the product and the injury
180. See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 528-29 (Wis. 1991)
(Steinmetz, J., concurring).
181. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 543.
182. Id. at 543-44.
183. Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 528 & n.4 (Steinmetz, J., concurring); Goodwin, supra
note 6, at 543 n.39 ("Product liability insurance is often unavailable or unaffordable
for a number of significant industries, including used product sellers.").
184. See Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 528 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 528-29 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 530 (Steinmetz, J., concurring); Kats, supra note 4, at 345-46.
187. See Kats, supra note 4, at 345 (citation omitted).
188. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 51, at 341, 344).
189. See Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 528-30 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
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caused by its defect, it is sometimes difficult or impossible for a used
goods dealer to locate a solvent manufacturer and trace the defect to
that manufacturer.1 90 The statute of limitations in each state also
presents significant barriers to indemnification and contribution. 191
As a result of these problems, many used goods dealers will be forced
192
to bear the full burden of unfavorable strict liability judgments.
Additionally, regardless of the difficulties associated with paying
damages and receiving compensation for those losses, used goods
dealers would be forced to adopt costly procedures aimed at avoiding
product-related injuries in the future if they hope to remain in business.1 93 Presumably, this would require used goods dealers to become
more knowledgeable about the history of use and the condition of
their products so the dealers could readily inspect, repair, or warn
consumers of the products' defects.' 94 This task could become extremely costly and burdensome, given that many used goods dealers
offer a wide variety of secondhand products for sale, and do not have
the technical understanding and proper equipment to sufficiently repair defective products. 195 In light of these difficulties, it becomes apparent that the imposition of strict liability to commercial sellers of
used goods would substantially increase the cost of doing business for
many such dealers who would be unable to operate at such an increased price. 196 Inevitably, many businesses that provide a useful
service to society would be forced to go out of business. 9 7
3.

Burden Placed on Consumers of Used Goods

Inasmuch as the application of strict liability to the used goods market will increase the cost of doing business for commercial sellers of
used goods or force them to go out of business, an increasingly significant burden will be placed on consumers of used goods. 1 98 Many consumers of used goods have "relatively low disposable incomes"' 199 and
purchase their basic household necessities from the used goods market because of the low prices." As commercial sellers of used goods
attempt to cope with the difficulties caused by the imposition of strict
liability, the prices of used goods will increase, forcing consumers to
190. See Kats, supra note 4, at 346.
191. See id. (citing Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979)).
192. See id.
193. See Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 18-19 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999).
194. See id. at 18.
195. See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 528 (Wis. 1991) (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
196. See id. at 529 (Steinmetz, J.,concurring).
197. See id. (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
198. See id. (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
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either pay the higher prices for commercial used goods 20 1 or substitute
less expensive, and possibly more risky, noncommercial used products. 2 0 2 Either way, consumers of used goods will be made worse off
in terms of their ability to acquire safe and inexpensive products.20 3
Furthermore, as a result of the application of strict liability, many used
goods dealers will be forced out of business and, most, if not all, will
have to increase the prices of their products.20 4 The result of this situation is that consumers of used goods will be subject to increased
prices for fewer available used goods.20 5 Also, as a consequence of
the inability of used goods dealers to operate at higher costs, consumers who are injured by defective used products will be inadequately
compensated
for their injuries and will have to bear the cost on their
6
own.

20

B.

Harm Caused by Refusing to Apply Strict Liability to
Commercial Sellers of Used Goods

For both parties involved, the reality of a products liability suit is
extremely grim. 20 7 First, the issues involved in a product liability case
are usually highly technical and arcane.20 8 Both parties must spend the
money and time to locate credible expert witnesses not only to testify,
but also to teach the attorneys about the technical aspects of the product. 20 9 Furthermore, most plaintiff's attorneys take product liability
suits on a contingency fee.21 0 Thus, the expense of trial preparation
and the trial itself must come out of the attorney's pockets. 211 This is
further complicated by the fact that if the case is lost, the attorney
receives nothing.21 2 As one commentator concludes:
Except for a few victims "lucky" enough (1) to be seriously injured
by a product with a demonstrably provable defect, (2) to hire skilled
counsel, and (3) to possess a case which-miracle of miracles-can
run the gantlet of countless legal and practical pitfalls, money which
could help to compensate injured consumers largely accrues to... a
number of thoroughly trained engineers and technical experts, and
some casualty insurance companies (with the latter loudly com201. Id. (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 529-30 (Steinmetz, J., concurring); see also supra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.
203. See Nelson, 467 N.W.2d at 529-30 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).
204. See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
205. Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
206. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 544.
207. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some
Proposals,59 VA. L. REV. 749, 752-53 (1973).
208. See id. at 752.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 753.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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plaining about how much money they are losing on the whole
operation)., 13
As a result, the decision to bring a products liability suit replete with
the potential to cost both sides a limitless amount of money and time,
is not easily made. a4 In fact, for many of the already disadvantaged
consumers of used goods, the decision is not made.21 5 Because of the
difficulties inherent in bringing a products liability suit, injured victims
who consult attorneys are unaware of when, how, and if they will be
compensated. 1 6 Consequently, to advise an injured consumer to pursue legal action may complicate their situation more than it helps.2 17
Moreover, because of the costs related to defending a product liability
suit, a successful defense of the suit may even result in forcing the
used goods dealer out of business.2 18
The complications outlined above occur regardless of the theories
of liability available to injured consumers of used goods. When one
evaluates the above-mentioned problems in light of the fact that injured consumers may have to sue under the negligence doctrine or
warranty theory instead of strict liability, it becomes apparent that
such a decision would cause a disproportionately greater burden on
injured consumers.21 9 Under the negligence doctrine, the used goods
dealer will not be held liable if he can show that he met his duty of
reasonable care. 22 0 Thus, the relevant issue in the negligence suit will
be what that duty of reasonable care entailed, and whether the used
goods dealer acted reasonably; not whether the product was defective
and caused the consumer to be injured, which would be the issue in a
strict liability suit. 22 1 Assuming that the used goods dealer was not
negligent, where does that leave the injured consumer? Should a used
goods dealer who sold a defective product that caused injuries be able
to avoid an adverse judgment simply by proving that he acted reasonably? Furthermore, the duty of reasonable care would inevitably be
linked to the profitability of the used goods dealer. The question
would be, "Did the used goods dealer behave as a reasonable dealer
in used goods with the same assets available for inspection, repair, or
warning consumers of the defects in his products?" Because many
used goods dealers are marginally profitable, satisfying the duty of
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 755-56.
See id. at 752.
See id. at 754.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 754.

218. See 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTER'S STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 265-66 (1991).
219. See Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 521, 526 (Wis. 1991).
220. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (speaking of manufacturer liability, Justice Traynor says that "[t]he
inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper care").
221. See id. at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring) (distinguishing a cause of action
grounded in negligence from a cause of action grounded in strict liability).
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reasonable care might only require that trivial precautions to be taken
and also might not prevent consumers from being injured by defective
used goods. Justice Traynor acknowledged this possibility in Escola,2 22 asserting that "[t]he injury from a defective product does not
become a matter of indifference because the defect arises from causes
The inference of
other than the negligence of the manufacturer ....
negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper
care." 2 23 Accordingly, Justice Traynor reasoned that strict liability
was necessary in order to remedy the negligence doctrine's inherent
inadequacy in preventing product-related injuries.2 24 He argued that
"[e]ven if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market. ' 225 Apart from the harm caused to consumers and used
goods dealers from the application of strict liability to the used goods
market, it would seem that strict liability is better suited to provide at
least some compensation than is the negligence doctrine. Forcing injured consumers to sue under the negligence theory would inevitably
lead to less product liability suits in this area and, consequently, fewer
injured consumers receiving compensation, because used goods dealers would not be held liable for the injury-causing defects in their
products. The duty of reasonable care does not deter used goods
dealers from selling defective products, and even if it did, used goods
dealers can relatively easily prove that they satisfied the duty.22 6
Moreover, it is unlikely that injured consumers will choose to pursue
valid product liability claims under the negligence doctrine, given the
cost and likely outcome of the suit.
Similarly, if the negligence doctrine is inadequate to provide compensation to injured consumers, then the warranty theory, with its
foundation in contract law, is also an inadequate theory of liability to
deal with product-related injuries.2 27 This is because the warranty theory poses many barriers to liability that make sense when applied to
commercial contracts but have little utility to provide compensation
for injured consumers.2 2 8 For instance, warranty theory has traditionally required a contract or reliance on some express or implied assertion by the seller, and notice to the seller.2 29 While these
requirements may serve to properly insulate commercial sellers from
invalid claims, when the consumer is injured by the product, these ob222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
See id. at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
See id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 97, at 691.
See id.
Id.
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stacles become a "booby-trap for the unwary. '23 0 Often, no contract
exists between the consumer and the seller, no assertions as to the
quality of the product are made, and the consumer does not have the
wherewithal to provide the seller with sufficient notice of the accident. 231 Furthermore, even if the consumer has met these requirements, he or she may still lose a valid warranty claim because of a
disclaimer.2 3 2 Injured consumers of used goods usually have neither
the assets available nor the legal knowledge necessary to know the
technical issues involved in a warranty suit. 233 While the detailed requirements for a warranty action may be reasonable for a "buyer" of
commercial goods, they only serve to hamper the ability of consumers
injured by defective goods to receive compensation.2 3 4
V.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

In light of the discussion above, it would seem that tort law is unable to resolve the issue of whether strict liability should be applied to
commercial sellers of used goods and, because of this, it continues to
pose a serious dilemma for judges who must attempt to make an argument justifying a decision either way. The crux of any effective resolution to this problem is to discover a way to maximize compensation to
injured consumers, while minimizing various costs of compensation
such as skyrocketing insurance premiums, litigation costs, increases in
the prices that consumers must pay for used goods, and general increases in the cost of doing business for commercial sellers of used
goods. Tort law is much too rigid and the theories of liability are too
grounded in their traditional roots to provide an adequate solution.
The negligence doctrine, the warranty theory, and strict products liability feed into the equation and wreak havoc on the other end. Why
continue to try and hammer a square peg into a round hole? Why
continue to try and fit this issue with existing theories of liability that
clearly do not resolve the problem, when a sufficient resolution could
be tailored to adequately resolve the issue by a state legislature?
Over the years, many scholars have advocated tort reform by substituting or supplementing tort law with highly detailed and creative regulation and no-fault compensation plans.23 5 The most widely accepted
compensation schemes in the United States are workers' compensation and automobile no-fault plans.2 36 Under the workers' compensation model, employers provide injured employees with compensation
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See

id.
id.
id. at 691-92.
id. at 691.

STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW:
NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 101

(1989).
236. See id.
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for lost income, medical expenses, and costs associated with rehabilitation for injuries that occur during the course of employment regardless of the employers' fault.2 37 Similarly, the no-fault automobile
insurance plan purports to provide all accident victims with compensation for less severe injuries regardless of fault, and in exchange for
compensation, the injured victim gives up his tort rights.23 8 It is highly
possible that some form of a no-fault compensation plan could and
should be constructed to deal with compensation issues for consumers
injured by defective used goods.
A.

Elective Plan

The plan would consist of an election process whereby consumers
may elect to give up their tort rights in exchange for prompt payment
of costs associated with lost income, medical expenses, and rehabilitation costs. 2 39 However, the traditional tort system would also remain
in effect. Under the no-fault plan, contributory negligence would not
be a defense.24 ° Also, no payments would be made for pain and suffering.24 1 Payments for medical benefits would be unlimited, but in
exchange for the prompt payment that the no-fault compensation plan
would offer, payments for lost wages would be capped at a certain
maximum amount and periodically paid as long as the injured consumer could not work.2 42 In order to extinguish the cost of product
liability suits as much as possible, the injured consumer would have to
choose under which system he wants to be compensated as soon as
possible after the accident.2 4 3
Similarly, the used goods dealer would have to decide the extent of
his coverage under the no-fault compensation plan.24 4 As an added
incentive to coverage under the no-fault plan, any used goods dealer
that chose to be covered exclusively by the plan could not be sued
under traditional theories of liability. 245 Furthermore, the used goods
dealer would have to choose whether to cover all defect-related injuries or only certain designated accidents. 246 This decision would bind
the injured party if made before the occurrence of the accident.24 7
237. Id.
238. See id. at 101-02.
239. The plan this Comment proposes is loosely based on previous plans proposed
by Professor O'Connell. O'Connell, supra note 207, at 774, cited in SUGARMAN, supra
note 235, at 104.
240. O'Connell, supra note 207, at 773.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 773-74.
243. See id. at 774.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Id.
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The benefits of this plan to used goods dealers would be numerous.
For example, although used goods dealers would have to provide compensation for more people, the amount paid would be considerably
less because they would only have to pay for costs not provided by
other forms of insurance. 248 Also, this type of no-fault plan would
decrease the loss in time and money associated with having to defend
a products liability suit. 249 The plan could also provide great benefits
for injured consumers. Instead of having to wait and see what, if anything, will come from a long and expensive product liability suit, injured consumers would have the option to receive prompt
compensation, which is probably the most grueling aspect of a product
liability suit.
B.

Funding for the No-Fault Compensation Plan

250
Because of the marginal profitability of many used goods dealers
and the relatively low incomes of consumers of used goods, 25 1 any nofault plan that would be beneficial to the used goods market would
have to be funded through a complex system of taxes, reimbursements, penalties, and awards in order to stabilize the costs to used
goods dealers and the price of used goods. This is because if the cost
of doing business dramatically increases, then used goods dealers will
be forced out of business. 25 2 Similarly, if the prices of used goods substantially increase, consumers of commercial used goods will no
longer be able to afford them and may substitute noncommercial used
goods.2 5 3 For these reasons, the no-fault compensation plan would
have to be managed by an agency charged with the task of compiling
data on the types of products that tend to be resold by manufacturers,
the types of such products that cause injury, and when in the chain of
distribution those defects in products that cause injury are most likely
to arise. The manufacturers most likely to sell defective products according to the data, and used goods dealers in general, would pay a
tax that would go into a fund to pay injured consumers and increase
inspection of the used goods in question. Manufacturers of the defective or "likely defective" products would pay more than used goods
dealers, because (1) They are generally in a better position financially
to bear the burden of accident-related injuries; (2) This would greatly
reduce situations in which used goods dealers cannot locate solvent
manufacturers for indemnification or contribution, or a statute of limitations has run; and (3) With manufacturers paying the majority of the

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 774-75.
id. at 775.
supra note 181 and
supra note 161 and
supra notes 177-79
supra notes 129-32

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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cost of accidents, the cost of doing business for used goods dealers and
the price of used goods will be better stabilized.
However, some penalties and reimbursements must exist in the nofault compensation plan in order to provide incentives for manufacturers and used goods dealers to increase inspection, repair, or warning of product defects and for manufacturers to maintain some kind of
relationship with the individuals who sell their products used. For example, periodic evaluations could be done to determine whether an
increase or decrease in product-related injuries had occurred for the
products labeled by the study as "most likely to be sold used and
cause injury". If it could be shown that because of increased attention
to the use and quality of the products the number of injuries had decreased, then the manufacturers would be reimbursed for a portion of
their contributions to the fund. However, if an increase in injuries had
occurred, then the manufacturer as well as the used goods dealer
would have to pay more into the fund. This method of funding the
no-fault compensation plan would provide incentives for manufacturers to keep track of their products and coordinate inspections with
used goods dealers to insure that the products are safe. Furthermore,
in addition to stabilizing the cost of doing business for used goods
dealers by placing the majority of the burden of the costs on manufacturers, this funding method also places penalties on used goods dealers who continue to sell defective used products that cause injury.
Presumably, if a used goods dealer is forced to go out of business because it cannot afford the penalty tax associated with continually selling defective goods, then it is best for society to have that dealer out
of business.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As it has been for the last thirty years, the idea of no-fault compensation in the area of products liability continues to be a relatively revolutionary one. 254 On one hand, manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors of products would be among the first to attack legislation
proposing a no-fault compensation plan because of the possible costs
to their respective enterprises. 5 On the other hand, even some dedicated liberals have refused to staunchly support programs for social
reform, which may be unpredictable and offer inconsistent results.2 56
Furthermore, individuals in the legal profession-lawyers as well as
no-fault compensation plans that do
judges-seem to be petrified by
257
not depend on fault or defect.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See O'Connell, supra note 207, at 795.
See id.
See id. at 795-96.
Id. at 769.
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It is evident that the application of strict liability to commercial sellers of used goods may begin a vicious cycle, which puts sellers out of
business in the end. However, the inherent problems in utilizing the
negligence and warranty theories of liability to provide compensation
to injured consumers is the reason for strict liability in products in the
first place. The logical solution would be to submit the issue to a state
legislature that could tailor an adequate solution, which would be free
of the devastating effects of tort law. One commentator's reaction to
the ability of the law to mature and expunge inconsistencies is that
"[t]he role of logic in law is to iron out the small contradictions, the
big ones we leave alone."2 5 Let us hope that this is not true.
Derrick Williams
258. See id. at 762 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort Law-Tort Watch, 34 AM.
L.J. 1, 32 (1972)).
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